A family may arrive in Canada carrying traditions shaped by another country, but decisions about children are quickly influenced by the realities of building a life here. New peer-reviewed research finds that immigrants still have slightly more children, on average, than Canadian-born residents, yet the difference has narrowed sharply over the past two decades.
The findings complicate a familiar assumption behind Canada’s demographic model: that immigration can continually offset low birth rates and population aging. Immigration remains essential to labour-force growth and community renewal, but newcomers are increasingly experiencing the same low-fertility environment as everyone else. Age at arrival, admission category and country of origin all matter, revealing a far more varied picture than the idea of immigrants as a single high-fertility group.
The Fertility Gap Is Closing
The study, published in Population Research and Policy Review in July 2026, examined fertility patterns from 2001 to 2021 using four long-form censuses and the 2011 National Household Survey. Researchers linked infants living in census families to their mothers and used age-specific birth patterns to estimate total fertility rates for different groups. That approach allowed them to compare immigrant and Canadian-born women across two decades while also separating immigrants by age at arrival, admission stream and country of birth.
In 2001, immigrant women had an estimated total fertility rate of 1.68 children, compared with 1.44 among Canadian-born women—a gap of 0.24 births. By 2021, the immigrant rate had fallen to 1.42 while the Canadian-born rate stood at 1.31, reducing the difference to 0.11. Immigrants therefore remained somewhat more fertile, but their decline was faster. The central story is not that both groups have become identical; it is that the historical gap has become much smaller and appears likely to narrow further.
Age at Arrival Changes the Pattern
The age at which someone moves to Canada was one of the clearest dividing lines in the results. Researchers classified people who arrived after age 15 as first-generation immigrants and those who arrived at or before 15 as the “1.5 generation.” First-generation immigrants recorded the highest fertility, with rates hovering near 2.0 between 2001 and 2016 before declining to 1.75 in 2021. Their family decisions may retain more influence from the social expectations and life plans formed before migration.
The pattern was strikingly different among those who arrived as children. The 1.5 generation had fertility rates between 1.36 and 1.46 from 2001 to 2016, then fell to 1.25 in 2021—below both first-generation immigrants and Canadian-born residents. A child who grows up in Canadian schools, enters the Canadian labour market and faces Canadian housing and relationship timelines may develop family plans that resemble those of locally born peers. The finding offers strong evidence of adaptation, although it does not prove which specific Canadian pressures or cultural influences caused the difference.
Economic Immigration Does Not Produce a Baby Boom
Canada selects a large share of permanent residents through economic programs, emphasizing education, language ability, work experience and skills needed in the labour market. That profile is often treated as a demographic advantage because many successful applicants are in their prime working years. The new findings show, however, that being young enough to work for decades does not necessarily mean having a large family after arrival.
Economic immigrants had a total fertility rate of 1.47 in 2016 and 1.32 in 2021, almost matching the low rate among Canadian-born residents. They were the lowest-fertility permanent-immigrant category in the study, despite representing more than half of permanent immigration in both years examined. The researchers suggest that employment establishment, professional advancement and financial stability may take priority during the settlement years. Picture a skilled newcomer completing licensing requirements, accepting an entry-level role and trying to secure suitable housing: parenthood may still be desired, but the timing can become difficult. The data reveal the outcome, though not the personal reasons behind every delayed or forgone birth.
Family and Refugee Streams Remain Higher
Family-class immigrants recorded the highest fertility among permanent-resident groups, at 2.18 in 2016 and 1.97 in 2021. That difference is understandable because many people in this stream arrive through spousal or partner sponsorship and may already be at a stage of life associated with marriage and parenthood. Even so, the 2021 rate was below the approximate replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, meaning the highest-fertility permanent stream was no longer producing enough births for long-term generational replacement without continued migration.
Refugees ranked second, with rates of 1.78 in 2016 and 1.77 in 2021. Their fertility was notably higher than that of economic immigrants but still below replacement. The researchers discuss several possible influences, including family norms in countries of origin and the desire to rebuild life after displacement, while also acknowledging that trauma, uncertainty and Canada’s cost of living can constrain family formation. These categories should not be treated as fixed cultural types. Each contains people with different histories, education levels, relationships and goals, and the study identifies group-level patterns rather than predicting any individual family’s choices.
Temporary Residents Record the Lowest Rate
Temporary residents had the lowest fertility of every category measured: 1.17 children per woman in 2016 and just 0.96 in 2021. This group includes many international students and temporary foreign workers whose legal status, employment or education may be tied to permits. Starting a family while studying, living apart from a partner or waiting to learn whether permanent residence will be possible can be considerably more complicated than doing so with settled status.
The result is especially relevant because Canada’s temporary population expanded rapidly after the pandemic, even though the study’s final observation reflects 2021 rather than the later peak. A low fertility rate among temporary residents does not mean they never have children. Some may postpone births until they obtain permanent residence, reunite with a partner or become more financially secure, meaning births could occur later rather than disappear entirely. The study cannot fully distinguish postponement from a permanently smaller completed family size. Still, a rate below one child per woman shows why simply increasing the number of students or temporary workers should not be assumed to generate lasting population replacement.
Canada’s Main Source Countries Have Changed Too
Fertility is falling in many of the countries from which Canada now receives large numbers of immigrants. In 2001, the leading countries of birth among immigrants reflected older migration waves, with the United Kingdom, China and Italy at the top. By 2021, India accounted for 10.7% of immigrants, while the Philippines and China each accounted for 8.6%. These countries have also moved through major demographic transitions, with smaller families becoming more common than they were a generation ago.
Among immigrant women from the top 10 source countries in 2021, every group recorded below-replacement fertility in Canada. Estimates ranged from 0.75 for Iranian-born women and 0.92 for Chinese-born women to 1.70 for Pakistani-born women. Immigrants from India and the Philippines had rates in Canada that were more than 50% below the rates in their origin countries across parts of the study period. This matters because Canada can no longer assume that newcomers will arrive from consistently high-fertility societies. The global decline is reshaping both the countries sending migrants and the family patterns immigrants establish after settlement.
A Large Share of Births Is Not the Same as High Fertility
Statistics Canada reported that 42.3% of babies born in Canada in 2024 had a foreign-born mother, nearly double the 22.5% share recorded in 1997. In Ontario and British Columbia, the proportion reached 48.7%. Those numbers show how central immigrant mothers have become to Canada’s annual births, especially in the country’s largest immigrant-receiving provinces. Without births to foreign-born mothers, the national number of births would have been declining since 2010.
That contribution can appear to conflict with research showing low immigrant fertility, but the measures answer different questions. The share of births describes who gave birth in a particular year; the total fertility rate estimates how many children women would have over their lifetimes if current age-specific rates continued. A growing immigrant population can therefore account for a larger share of babies even when the average fertility of immigrant women is falling. Canada may have more foreign-born women in childbearing ages, producing many births collectively, while each woman has a relatively small family on average. Understanding the denominator prevents a large birth share from being mistaken for a newcomer-driven baby boom.
Immigration Still Matters, but Aging Continues
The findings do not diminish immigration’s immediate importance. International migration has supplied most of Canada’s recent population growth and brings workers, students, caregivers, entrepreneurs and family members into communities that would otherwise grow much more slowly. In 2024, economic-class immigrants represented 58.2% of permanent resident admissions, reflecting the system’s strong labour-market focus. Foreign-born mothers also prevented national births from falling as sharply as they otherwise would have.
The limitation is time. Immigrants grow older, retire and eventually draw on health and pension systems just as Canadian-born residents do. When newcomers and their children also have below-replacement fertility, each new cohort must be followed by another migration cohort to maintain growth—a pattern the researchers describe as a demographic revolving door. Statistics Canada projects that population aging will continue under every major scenario, even though immigration can slow some effects and improve the working-age balance. The practical conclusion is not that immigration has failed. It is that immigration can replenish population numbers and labour supply in the near term without permanently resolving the deeper arithmetic of low fertility and longer life expectancy.
The Policy Question Is Broader Than Immigration Targets
The study shifts the debate away from a simple choice between more immigration and fewer immigrants. Canada can continue using migration to meet labour needs while also asking why people—newcomers and Canadian-born residents alike—often build smaller families than they may have imagined. Statistics Canada found that 46% of Canadians in 2024 wanted one or more biological children in the future, up from 41% in 2021. Intentions do not guarantee births, but they show that record-low fertility cannot be explained only by a universal rejection of parenthood.
Policy discussions therefore extend into housing, stable employment, partner formation, reproductive health, parental leave and access to child care. The new immigrant-fertility study did not directly measure those causes, so it should not be used as proof that any single policy would raise birth rates. It also notes limitations: 2021 may reflect pandemic disruptions, a small share of infants could not be linked to mothers, and the method estimates fertility for the period before each census rather than a standard calendar year. Its strongest contribution is diagnostic. Canada’s demographic future requires coordinated planning, not the assumption that immigration alone will keep every generation equally large.
