Canada’s effort to rely less heavily on the United States is pushing Ottawa toward economic partners that once sat well outside the centre of Canadian trade policy. Türkiye is quickly becoming one of them. Reuters reported on October 2 that Prime Minister Mark Carney is planning a dedicated bilateral visit to Türkiye later this month, with trade, energy and defence expected to feature prominently.
The outreach builds on negotiations for a Canada–Türkiye free-trade agreement launched in July. Bilateral commerce remains tiny beside Canada’s enormous U.S. relationship, so Türkiye cannot replace the American market. What it can offer is another piece of a broader diversification strategy—one that Ottawa increasingly sees as economic insurance against tariffs, political disputes and future disruptions concentrated in a single trading relationship.
A Reported Visit Would Put Türkiye Higher on Ottawa’s Agenda
Reuters reported that Carney plans to travel to Türkiye later in October for talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, citing four sources familiar with the plans. If it proceeds as described, the trip would represent an unusually focused Canadian diplomatic push toward Ankara. The exact dates and agenda had not been publicly confirmed by either leader’s office when the report appeared, making that distinction important.
The relationship has nevertheless been moving quickly even without the reported visit. Carney met Erdoğan during the NATO Summit in Ankara on July 7, when the two leaders formally launched free-trade negotiations and discussed defence, energy, critical minerals and advanced technologies. Canadian and Turkish officials have continued working since then. What was once a relatively modest commercial relationship is therefore being folded into Ottawa’s much larger effort to build more economic options outside the United States.
Canada’s U.S. Dependence Is Falling—but It Is Still Enormous
The scale of the challenge becomes clear in Canada’s trade statistics. Statistics Canada reported that 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports went to the United States in 2025. That was down significantly from 75.9% in 2024, but it still means roughly seven dollars out of every ten in Canadian goods exports were tied to one foreign market.
There are already signs of diversification. Canadian merchandise exports to countries other than the United States jumped 17.2% in 2025, while total merchandise trade with non-U.S. countries increased 14.3% to $553 billion. At the same time, exports to the United States declined 5.8%, and Canada’s merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. fell from $101.3 billion in 2024 to $81.6 billion. Those numbers help explain why Ottawa is treating new trade relationships less as optional expansion and more as a way of spreading economic exposure.
Türkiye Is Starting From a Relatively Small Trade Base
Canada and Türkiye already exchange billions of dollars in goods, but the relationship remains small in Canadian terms. Global Affairs Canada says two-way merchandise trade reached approximately C$4.3 billion in 2025, consisting of about C$1.1 billion in Canadian exports and C$3.2 billion in imports from Türkiye. Reuters calculated that Türkiye represented less than 0.3% of Canada’s total merchandise trade that year.
The comparison with the United States is striking. Reuters put Canada–U.S. merchandise trade at roughly C$1 trillion in 2025. That means even dramatic growth with Türkiye would not materially replace the American relationship in the near term. Diversification instead works by accumulation: Türkiye, Europe, ASEAN, India, the Gulf states and other markets collectively reduce concentration. For Canadian companies, several medium-sized markets can also provide alternatives when access to one dominant customer suddenly becomes more expensive or uncertain.
Free-Trade Talks Have Moved Quickly in Only a Few Months
The trade negotiations developed rapidly. Canadian and Turkish trade ministers agreed in June to begin exploratory discussions toward an agreement. Carney and Erdoğan then formally launched negotiations on July 7, instructing technical teams to establish the scope and ambitions of what both governments describe as a comprehensive and modern free-trade agreement.
Canada subsequently held public consultations from July 31 through September 14. The government sought input on tariffs, services, technical barriers, agriculture, government procurement, labour, environmental standards and responsible business conduct. Momentum continued at the G20 trade meetings in Milwaukee this week. Türkiye’s Trade Ministry said Minister Ömer Bolat and Canadian International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu discussed the process on October 1 and confirmed an objective of completing the current exploratory and scoping work by the end of October. A political launch, however, is only the beginning; the detailed tariff schedules and rules will determine the eventual commercial value.
Prairie Agriculture Already Gives the Relationship a Practical Foundation
For parts of Canada, trade with Türkiye is already tangible rather than theoretical. Global Affairs Canada reported that lentils and chickpeas were Canada’s biggest merchandise export category to Türkiye in 2024, worth approximately C$393 million. Iron and steel waste and scrap followed at C$167 million, while soybeans accounted for another C$113 million.
That agricultural connection matters particularly for Western Canada. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada identifies Türkiye as one of the larger Middle Eastern and North African destinations for Canadian agricultural and food exports. Canadian pulse producers operate in global markets where access can shift because of harvest conditions, tariffs or policy changes in major importing countries. Maintaining several large customers therefore has practical value. A trade agreement could potentially address tariffs and technical barriers, although agricultural negotiations are often among the most complicated parts of trade talks because both governments must consider sensitive domestic producers as well as exporters seeking greater access.
Nuclear Energy Could Produce a Much Larger Canadian Commercial Opportunity
Energy cooperation may eventually become more valuable than conventional merchandise trade. In March, Montréal-based AtkinsRéalis announced a memorandum of understanding with Türkiye Nuclear Energy Company, or TÜNAŞ, to examine the potential deployment of Canadian CANDU reactor technology as Türkiye expands its nuclear power program. The agreement covers technical evaluations, licensing requirements, financing structures, localization and workforce development.
Türkiye’s Energy Ministry said the work involves assessing CANDU technology for the country’s planned nuclear expansion. AtkinsRéalis said Türkiye intends to add three additional nuclear reactors to its fleet. The development aligns with Canada’s own 2026 Nuclear Energy Strategy, which explicitly identifies international CANDU projects and nuclear exports as opportunities for Canadian companies and supply chains. A reactor project would be far more consequential than an ordinary shipment of goods: nuclear facilities involve engineering, equipment, financing, servicing and technical relationships that can stretch across several decades.
Defence Has Re-Emerged as Another Area of Cooperation
Defence relations between the two countries have also changed substantially. Canada previously applied a presumptive-denial policy to applications for exports of military items to Türkiye. Global Affairs Canada removed that policy on January 29, 2024, after discussions with Ankara over end-use and re-export assurances. Military and dual-use export applications are now assessed individually under Canada’s normal risk-assessment framework rather than automatically presumed to be denied.
The relationship expanded further at the July NATO Summit. Türkiye joined Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine in supporting the proposed Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. The Canada-led initiative is intended to mobilize public and private financing for defence production and supply chains, with operations targeted to begin as early as 2027. Carney and Erdoğan have separately identified aerospace, defence technology and industrial capacity as potential areas for deeper cooperation, placing security policy increasingly alongside conventional trade diplomacy.
Türkiye Connects a Large Domestic Market With European Supply Chains
Türkiye offers more than its bilateral Canadian trade numbers suggest. World Bank data puts its population at roughly 85.9 million and its 2025 economy at approximately US$1.6 trillion. It is also deeply connected to European manufacturing and trade networks. The European Union and Türkiye have operated a customs union covering most industrial products since the mid-1990s.
EU–Türkiye goods trade reached more than €217 billion in 2025. The European Commission says 42.7% of Turkish goods exports went to the EU that year, while 35.3% of Türkiye’s goods imports originated there. Those connections make Türkiye an important production, transportation and commercial hub between European and surrounding markets. A Canadian free-trade agreement would not automatically give Canadian goods tariff-free access to the European Union—Canada already manages its EU relationship separately—but Turkish integration with European supply chains can create partnerships in manufacturing, aerospace, machinery and infrastructure beyond purely domestic Turkish demand.
The Turkish Market Also Comes With Economic Risks
A larger economy does not automatically mean an easy market. Türkiye has spent years dealing with unusually high inflation and significant financial volatility. Its central bank reported annual consumer inflation of 31.51% in August 2026, even after substantial progress in bringing price growth down from earlier highs. High inflation can complicate long-term contracts, financing, wages and pricing decisions for companies operating across currencies.
The industrial picture has also been uneven. S&P Global’s Turkish manufacturing purchasing managers’ index fell to 47.9 in September, according to Reuters, remaining below the 50 level that separates expansion from contraction. None of those conditions prevents Canadian firms from expanding in Türkiye, particularly in long-term sectors such as nuclear power, aerospace and agriculture. They do underline why diversification should not simply mean exchanging dependence on one market for dependence on another. Companies still have to account for currency, financing, regulatory and geopolitical risks market by market.
Türkiye Is One Part of a Much Bigger Canadian Trade Pivot
Ottawa’s Türkiye push makes more sense when viewed alongside its other initiatives. Carney’s government has set an objective of doubling Canadian exports to non-U.S. markets over the next decade. Canada is simultaneously pursuing deeper economic ties with the Philippines and ASEAN, expanding partnerships in the Gulf, re-engaging large economies including India and China, and investing in transportation and energy infrastructure intended to move Canadian exports toward overseas customers.
The recently designated Pacific Link oil pipeline is another example of the same strategy, with the government saying the proposed project would move an additional one million barrels of Canadian crude per day toward Pacific markets. Türkiye therefore does not need to become another United States for the policy to matter. The broader objective is a network in which no single relationship carries quite as much weight. Free trade with Ankara, agricultural sales, nuclear projects and defence cooperation would each add another strand to that network—and provide an early test of how quickly Canada can turn diversification rhetoric into durable commercial relationships.
