LeBlanc Says Canada Must Accept Some Trump Tariffs Even if Washington Agrees to a Deal

A trade agreement with Washington may no longer mean tariff-free access for some of Canada’s most important industries. Canada–U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc has warned that even if Ottawa reaches a deal with President Donald Trump’s administration, tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles, and lumber are likely to remain in some form.

His comments signal a difficult reality for Canadian businesses already struggling with months of trade uncertainty. While Ottawa continues pushing for lower duties and a more predictable trading relationship, eliminating every American tariff may no longer be achievable.

With negotiations making limited progress and another potential tariff increase approaching in January, the Canadian government faces an increasingly complicated choice: secure meaningful relief while accepting some remaining trade barriers, or continue resisting an agreement that could leave major industries vulnerable.

LeBlanc Draws a Line Between a Deal and Zero Tariffs

Dominic LeBlanc’s latest message is not that Canada should welcome American tariffs. It is that a negotiated settlement may still leave some of them in place. In a November 19 interview with CBC’s Power & Politics, the minister said Canadians should be realistic about the prospect of continuing duties on key sectors. His test is whether the remaining charges allow Canadian industries to survive and compete over the long term, not whether an agreement produces an attractive announcement in Ottawa.

That distinction matters to exporters who have spent months trying to price contracts without knowing their future costs. A lower tariff could restore some competitiveness even if it falls short of the duty-free trade businesses previously expected. LeBlanc also made clear that negotiations had advanced but not far enough for Canada to sign. His comments describe a possible compromise, not an agreement already reached or a blanket Canadian commitment to accept whatever Washington demands.

An Interim Agreement Could Unlock Wider Negotiations

Ottawa is pursuing a smaller, interim arrangement before trying to settle every dispute in the wider North American trading relationship. LeBlanc has indicated that such an agreement could reduce U.S. Section 232 tariffs affecting steel, aluminum, vehicles and lumber, while Canada seeks the complete removal of the separate Section 338 duties. He also suggested progress on those measures could help restart substantive discussions about the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement, known in Canada as CUSMA.

The proposal remains a negotiating objective rather than a finished deal. At a November 19 advisory committee meeting, LeBlanc and chief negotiator Janice Charette discussed ongoing contacts with Washington, while Ambassador Mark Wiseman provided an update from the American capital. Reports citing committee members describe a desire for an arrangement before year-end, although LeBlanc has said January or February would still be acceptable if a better agreement required more time. For companies awaiting clarity, that makes the timetable both urgent and uncertain.

Why a Trade Agreement Does Not Automatically Cancel Every Tariff

The dispute is complicated by the different American laws used to impose duties. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act permits restrictions tied to national security concerns and underpins tariffs on products such as steel, aluminum, automobiles and lumber. Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is different: the Trump administration invoked it over alleged discrimination against American commerce, imposing 50% duties on specified Canadian goods after talks collapsed in August.

Neither category can be treated as a single tariff covering every Canadian export. Rates vary by product, and the eligibility of goods for preferential CUSMA treatment does not automatically erase these additional measures. U.S. congressional researchers have also documented changes to Section 338 product lists and circumstances in which duties can overlap. That complexity helps explain LeBlanc’s approach. Removing one group of punitive tariffs while reducing another could produce substantial relief, even though some Canadian shipments would still face added costs at the border.

The Auto Industry Faces a Particularly Dangerous Deadline

The potential January escalation is especially worrying for Canadian vehicle manufacturers. After the August breakdown, Trump threatened to raise U.S. tariffs on Canadian cars, trucks and automotive parts to 50% starting January 1, 2027. Existing treatment is more complicated than a flat charge on every vehicle: for qualifying Canadian-made passenger vehicles, the United States has generally applied its 25% automobile tariff to the non-U.S. content rather than the entire vehicle’s value.

Canada’s federal government says the auto sector supports more than 500,000 workers, including roughly 125,000 direct manufacturing jobs. More than 90% of Canadian-built vehicles are exported to the United States. Those figures give the dispute a human dimension in Ontario communities where an assembly plant anchors parts suppliers, transport firms and local services. A tariff that makes new investment less appealing can threaten future production decisions even before a factory announces layoffs or changes a shift schedule.

Steel and Aluminum Need a Deal That Preserves Production

For metal producers, LeBlanc’s emphasis on long-term viability is more than diplomatic language. The Bank of Canada reported in April that U.S. tariffs had helped drive Canadian steel exports sharply lower, with shipments falling by about half in its assessment. Steel mills face high fixed costs, while their customers need reliable prices and delivery schedules. A reduced duty may help preserve orders, but an uncompetitive rate could simply prolong the pressure.

Aluminum faces a different balance of risks. Statistics Canada estimated that U.S. demand supported roughly 12,000 jobs in Canadian alumina and aluminum production and processing in 2024, representing more than three-quarters of employment in that industry. Higher metal prices may protect some primary producers while squeezing smaller fabricators that buy aluminum and sell finished products across the border. For workers in Quebec smelters and Ontario steel towns, the crucial question is whether tariff relief can sustain production, investment and skilled employment.

Lumber Shows How Multiple Duties Can Compound the Damage

Canadian lumber producers illustrate why a simple promise to lower tariffs may not settle every trade dispute. U.S. measures include a 10% Section 232 tariff on softwood timber and lumber, alongside longstanding anti-dumping and countervailing duties that vary by company. Some wood and paper products also face separate Section 338 measures. Global Affairs Canada warns that applicable charges can accumulate depending on the product, leaving exporters with a much heavier burden than a headline tariff rate suggests.

The consequences extend beyond major forestry companies. The Bank of Canada reported that lumber exports in February 2026 were roughly 20% below their 2024 average, against a backdrop of production declines that began before the latest trade conflict. In smaller forestry communities, reduced mill activity can ripple through trucking, equipment maintenance and nearby shops. Even a welcome reduction in one U.S. duty would not necessarily remove the others. That is why relief must be judged product by product, rather than by a single percentage.

The Failed August Negotiations Still Define Canada’s Limits

Canada has already demonstrated that it is prepared to walk away when the proposed terms are too costly. On August 21, Prime Minister Mark Carney suspended negotiations after last-minute U.S. demands, and the next day publicly explained Ottawa’s decision. He said Canada had offered concessions, including the possibility of withdrawing some retaliatory tariffs if Washington substantially lowered duties on strategic Canadian exports. But he rejected conditions that would weaken Canada’s sovereignty, cultural protections or ability to pursue independent trade relationships.

Washington disputed parts of Canada’s account of the breakdown, underscoring how far apart the two governments remained. The dispute quickly became more expensive: new American Section 338 tariffs took effect, and Canada announced matching countermeasures on approximately C$27.6 billion in U.S. imports beginning in September. That history gives LeBlanc’s latest comments added weight. Accepting a reduced sectoral tariff could be compatible with Canada’s red lines, but accepting restrictions on national decision-making is a separate and much more contentious question.

CUSMA Is Still Operating, but Renewal Remains Unresolved

An interim deal could also create momentum for the broader North American trade framework. CUSMA entered into force in July 2020, and its first scheduled joint review occurred on July 1, 2026. Canada and Mexico supported extending the agreement, but the United States declined to renew it in its current form. That decision did not cancel CUSMA or immediately end preferential trade for qualifying goods. The agreement remains in force, with further annual reviews required unless all three partners agree to an extension.

Without such agreement, the pact is scheduled to expire in 2036. That distant date may sound reassuring, but annual uncertainty matters when an automaker considers a multibillion-dollar assembly investment or a supplier plans a new production line. LeBlanc has suggested that resolving immediate tariff disputes could open the way to more meaningful CUSMA discussions. The challenge is to give businesses near-term relief without mistaking a temporary tariff arrangement for lasting continental trade certainty.

Democratic Control of Congress Does Not End Trump’s Veto

November’s U.S. midterm elections changed the political landscape, giving Democrats control of the House of Representatives and Senate when the new Congress convenes in January. Some lawmakers have promised to target Trump’s tariffs on Canadian goods, including those imposed under Section 338. Congressional hearings, investigations and legislation could increase pressure on the White House. Yet none of those tools automatically cancels a tariff already imposed by the executive branch.

Trump retains presidential veto power. Reversing his policy through legislation over his objections would require support from two-thirds of both congressional chambers, meaning Democrats would need substantial Republican backing. Trade specialists also note that some Democrats support national-security tariffs designed to protect domestic industries, even while opposing other measures. LeBlanc has therefore cautioned against treating the election results as a guaranteed solution. For Ottawa, engaging directly with the administration remains necessary, regardless of the new balance of power on Capitol Hill.

Canada’s Long-Term Response Cannot Depend on Washington Alone

Even the best possible interim deal would leave Canadian companies exposed to future shifts in U.S. trade policy. Ottawa is responding on two fronts: negotiating for better access south of the border while supporting production at home. In November, the federal government adjusted tariff-relief measures for Canadian importers, and Ontario and Ottawa have announced support for steel and automotive investment. Such policies cannot replace American customers overnight, but they can help firms manage costs and preserve capacity.

The government is also pursuing new markets. In November, Canada announced the conclusion or substantial conclusion of free-trade negotiations with the Philippines and ASEAN, with signature still ahead. Ottawa estimates the proposed ASEAN agreement could eventually support nearly 14,000 Canadian jobs. These opportunities will take time to materialize. For now, the most meaningful U.S. deal would combine substantially lower tariffs, predictable rules and enough room for Canadian factories to invest with confidence. LeBlanc’s warning is that this outcome may still include tariffs.

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