Canada left the U.S.-hosted G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Milwaukee with its most important commercial dispute still unresolved. International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu spoke with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on the sidelines, but no Canada–U.S. agreement was announced, and Greer said a handful of outstanding issues remained difficult to resolve. At the same time, Ottawa used the gathering to widen its economic conversations, holding meetings with counterparts from India, the European Union, China and several other major markets. The result was less a breakthrough than a snapshot of Canada’s current trade strategy: keep channels with Washington open while building more options elsewhere. That shift is already moving from broad diplomatic language into scheduled negotiations, trade missions, digital-trade talks and market-access initiatives.
Milwaukee Kept the Channel Open, Not the Deal
The meeting in Milwaukee created contact between Ottawa and Washington, but it did not amount to a formal bilateral negotiating round. Sidhu and Greer held what officials described as a “pull-aside” conversation, an informal exchange on the margins of the G20. Sidhu said he raised trade uncertainty, including its effects on the auto sector, while also discussing World Trade Organization reform and rules-based trade. Greer later said technical talks with Canada were continuing but that several outstanding matters were “quite difficult to resolve.” He also said his principal Canadian counterpart for the bilateral file remained Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc.
That distinction matters because the G20 gathering was never positioned as the venue where the full Canada–U.S. dispute would necessarily be settled. Greer said the Trump administration remained open to a deal but was “not inclined to go to zero tariffs,” underscoring that the two governments were still working from different assumptions about the future trading relationship. For Canadian manufacturers, especially in highly integrated sectors such as autos, the practical message was that uncertainty remained after Milwaukee even though the governments were still talking.
The G20 Itself Was Split on Major Trade Questions
Canada’s bilateral problems with Washington unfolded inside a G20 meeting that was itself divided over major trade rules. The U.S. presidency put four issues at the centre of the ministerial: coercive use of food trade, forced labour in supply chains, structural excess capacity and production, and possible changes to the World Trade Organization’s most-favoured-nation principle. The ministers did reach consensus on condemning the weaponization of food through coercive trade actions, giving the gathering at least one formal area of agreement.
Other files showed much less common ground. The United States, Mexico and Argentina issued a statement on eliminating forced labour from global supply chains, but the full G20 did not reach consensus on that initiative. USTR also said that while many members expressed concern about structural excess capacity, a smaller group opposed creating a pathway toward cooperative action. Those divisions help explain why Milwaukee produced discussions and statements rather than a broad new trade compact. For Canada, the meeting functioned as both a multilateral forum and a crowded venue for bilateral diplomacy.
India Is the Most Immediate New Negotiating Track
India stands out because the Canada–India file already has a concrete negotiating calendar. On the margins of the G20 meeting, Sidhu met Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal and discussed progress toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. Global Affairs Canada said the fifth negotiating round is scheduled for October 5 to 9, only days after the Milwaukee gathering. Ottawa and New Delhi have also stated a shared objective of trying to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2026, although that remains a negotiating goal rather than a guaranteed outcome.
The commercial base is meaningful but still far smaller than Canada’s relationship with the United States. Global Affairs Canada reported that two-way Canada–India merchandise trade reached C$13.6 billion in 2025, while goods and services trade totalled C$30.4 billion. The two governments have set an ambition of increasing bilateral trade to C$70 billion annually by 2030. Sidhu is also scheduled to lead a Team Canada Trade Mission to India from October 12 to 17, giving businesses another channel to pursue deals while the government-to-government negotiations continue.
The EU Offers Canada a Trade Framework Already in Place
Europe represents a different kind of diversification opportunity because Canada is not starting from scratch. Sidhu met EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič in Milwaukee, where they discussed critical minerals, defence, digital trade and the next phase of the Canada–EU economic relationship. Their talks build on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, which has been provisionally applied since 2017. Global Affairs Canada says bilateral merchandise trade is now close to 80% higher than before CETA, while total Canada–EU trade in goods and services was approximately C$178 billion in 2025.
The next layer is increasingly focused on sectors that did not dominate traditional tariff negotiations. Canada and the EU formally launched negotiations on a digital trade agreement in March 2026, with the aim of adding clearer rules for areas such as digital transactions and cross-border business. Sidhu and Šefčovič are also due to meet again at an informal gathering of EU trade ministers in Dublin. Canada will then host European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at a Canada–EU summit in Montréal on October 29 and 30.
China Is Back in the Diversification Picture—with Limits
China was also part of Sidhu’s Milwaukee schedule, although the public record is thinner than it is for India or the European Union. Global Affairs Canada confirmed that Sidhu met Li Chenggang, China’s international trade representative and vice-minister of commerce, but Ottawa’s October 2 G20 release did not provide a detailed bilateral readout. That makes it important not to overstate what was achieved in Milwaukee. The meeting is better understood as one point in a broader Canada–China economic re-engagement already underway in 2026.
Earlier this year, the federal government set a goal of increasing Canadian exports to China by 50% by 2030. It also announced renewed market access in several agricultural categories, including lower Chinese tariffs on Canadian canola seed and temporary suspension of additional tariffs on products such as canola meal, peas, lobster and crab. China was Canada’s second-largest single-country merchandise trading partner in 2025, with two-way merchandise trade of C$125.1 billion. That scale makes China commercially significant, but the relationship also involves policy sensitivities that differ substantially from Canada’s dealings with India or the EU.
The New Outreach Is Concentrating on Strategic Sectors
The pattern across India, Europe and China shows that Ottawa’s diversification drive is not simply about selling more of the same products to different customers. With India, Canadian officials have emphasized energy, critical minerals and other commodities alongside a broader trade agreement. With the EU, current work extends beyond CETA into digital trade, defence cooperation and critical minerals. With China, recent economic engagement has included agriculture, energy, clean technology and automobiles. The overlap is notable: energy security, advanced manufacturing, minerals and digital commerce repeatedly appear in Canada’s newer trade discussions.
That approach reflects how trade policy has become increasingly intertwined with industrial and security policy. A digital agreement with Europe affects data-driven services and technology firms; critical-mineral partnerships can influence battery, defence and clean-energy supply chains; agricultural market access with China has immediate consequences for farmers and seafood exporters. These are not interchangeable markets, and each relationship carries different rules and political constraints. For Canadian businesses, diversification therefore looks less like finding one replacement customer and more like building several specialized channels that can absorb different products, services and investment flows.
Canada’s Trade Numbers Show Why Diversification Is a Long Game
The case for diversification is easy to see in Canada’s export concentration. Global Affairs Canada’s 2026 State of Trade report says 72% of Canadian goods exports went to the United States in 2025, while the U.S. accounted for 53% of services exports. At the same time, exports to non-U.S. markets rose 11.1% in 2025 as exports to the United States fell 3.7%. Non-U.S. markets consequently reached 32.8% of Canada’s total goods-and-services exports, their highest share in more than four decades.
Those figures show progress without suggesting that Canada can quickly reproduce the depth of the U.S. relationship elsewhere. Geography, infrastructure and decades of integrated production still give the American market an unusually large role, particularly for merchandise trade. Ottawa’s formal diversification target is to double non-U.S. exports over the next decade, an objective the federal government says would add roughly C$300 billion in trade. India, the EU and China can all contribute to that target, but the strategy depends on accumulating gains across multiple markets rather than relying on a single new partner to absorb the volume now tied to the United States.
The Next Few Weeks Will Test Whether Diplomacy Turns Into Deals
Milwaukee ended without a Canada–U.S. breakthrough, but the calendar after Milwaukee is unusually busy. Canada and India are scheduled to hold their fifth CEPA negotiating round from October 5 to 9, followed by a Team Canada Trade Mission to India from October 12 to 17. Sidhu and Šefčovič are expected to meet again in Dublin, and Canada will host the EU summit in Montréal on October 29 and 30. The G20 process itself continues toward the leaders’ summit in Miami in December.
The North American file will remain active at the same time. On October 2, USTR opened a public consultation process for the 2027 joint review of the USMCA, with comments due January 12, 2027. That process is separate from the unresolved tariff dispute, but it illustrates how many layers of the Canada–U.S. relationship remain in motion. The key measure of Ottawa’s diversification push will therefore be concrete outcomes: concluded agreements, expanded market access, investment commitments and actual export growth. Milwaukee did not settle Canada’s U.S. problem, but it showed how broadly Ottawa is now trying to expand the number of markets and negotiating channels available to Canadian businesses.
