Canada was conspicuously absent when the United States and nine international partners signed a new declaration aimed at protecting the technologies and critical infrastructure behind artificial intelligence.
Announced on November 15, 2026, the San Francisco Declaration brings together major American allies, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom. Canada, despite its vast critical-mineral resources and deeply integrated trade relationship with Washington, was not among the signatories.
The agreement represents a new stage in President Donald Trump’s effort to strengthen technology supply chains and reduce strategic vulnerabilities, particularly those associated with China. However, it is part of the larger Pax Silica initiative rather than an entirely new 10-country alliance. Canada’s absence raises important questions about its role in shaping the next generation of global technology and economic-security partnerships.
A Ten-Government Declaration Leaves Canada Off the List
The United States formally announced the San Francisco Declaration on November 15, following a gathering known as the Pax Silica Founders Retreat. The participating governments were the United States, Australia, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. Together, they committed to cooperating on the security of sensitive technologies and infrastructure supporting advanced artificial intelligence. The gathering was convened by Jacob Helberg, the U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs, who has played a leading role in advancing the Trump administration’s technology-security agenda.
Canada’s absence is particularly noticeable because several participating countries are established Canadian partners in defence, trade and technology. Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, belong to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership alongside Canada and the United States. Yet Ottawa was not included among the governments signing this particular declaration. The distinction is significant, although the published announcement does not establish why Canada was omitted or whether an invitation was extended. It would therefore be premature to interpret the absence as evidence of a deliberate diplomatic punishment.
The Agreement Builds on a Much Larger American Initiative
The San Francisco Declaration is the latest development within Pax Silica, an American-led initiative launched in December 2025 to strengthen supply chains supporting artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors and critical minerals. Its name reflects the importance of silicon and semiconductor technology to modern economic power. The initiative brings governments and industries together around the idea that technological leadership depends on secure access to raw materials, manufacturing facilities, energy and logistics. The November declaration is designed to move participating governments toward more coordinated action rather than establish an entirely separate international organization.
An important distinction is that Pax Silica already extends well beyond the ten governments that signed in San Francisco. The U.S. State Department identified Paraguay as its 26th signatory in October 2026, illustrating how much the broader initiative had expanded. Canada had previously participated as a guest contributor in discussions surrounding the original initiative, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. However, it was not among the latest declaration’s signatories. That makes Canada’s position more complicated than outright exclusion from every American-led critical-minerals discussion, although it still leaves questions about Ottawa’s future influence.
What the Signed Declaration Actually Promises
The San Francisco Declaration identifies two broad areas requiring coordinated protection: sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. Sensitive technologies include equipment, software, materials, specialized knowledge and production capabilities that could provide hostile actors with military, intelligence or economic advantages. Critical infrastructure includes transportation networks, ports, communications systems, energy facilities and digital platforms essential to technology supply chains. The agreement reflects a growing recognition that protecting advanced artificial intelligence requires securing much more than computer chips or software. A disruption at a major shipping terminal, for example, could interfere with production even when the technology itself remains secure.
The participating governments also agreed to establish working groups covering five areas: innovation-friendly policies, advanced AI adoption, supply-chain cooperation, security hubs and infrastructure resilience. These groups are intended to develop practical cooperation, but the declaration does not itself introduce new export restrictions, specific financial commitments or binding implementation deadlines. Its immediate importance is diplomatic and strategic rather than legislative. For Canada, the longer-term concern is whether rules and investment priorities developed through these discussions could influence Canadian companies without Ottawa having a direct role in shaping them.
Canada’s Enormous Mineral Trade With the U.S. Makes Its Absence Significant
Canada’s omission is especially striking when viewed against the scale of its existing mineral relationship with the United States. According to Natural Resources Canada, bilateral trade in minerals and metals reached approximately $129.3 billion in 2025. Canadian exports to the American market accounted for $76.4 billion of that total, including substantial shipments of aluminum, steel, copper and potash. The United States also purchased approximately $28.8 billion worth of Canadian critical minerals, representing about 57% of Canada’s total critical-mineral exports. These figures demonstrate how closely the two economies remain connected through the materials that support manufacturing and infrastructure.
That relationship has nevertheless faced increasing pressure from American trade restrictions. Natural Resources Canada reports that Canadian mineral exports to the United States declined by approximately 9% in 2025, coinciding with tariffs affecting aluminum, steel and certain copper products. Against that backdrop, Canada’s absence from another U.S.-led economic-security initiative carries additional diplomatic significance. However, participation in the new declaration is not a prerequisite for continuing mineral trade, and nothing in its published text establishes additional tariffs or restrictions on Canadian exports. The potential consequences remain linked to decisions participating governments may make later.
Canada Possesses Many of the Resources These Alliances Need
Canada has a substantial natural-resource advantage in the competition to secure technology supply chains. The country’s official critical-minerals list contains 34 minerals, including copper, nickel, cobalt, graphite, lithium, rare earth elements and silicon metal. These materials support industries ranging from electronics and telecommunications to batteries, advanced manufacturing and defence. Natural Resources Canada’s February 2026 industry figures identified Canada as one of the world’s five leading producers of 11 critical minerals. Its existing mining and processing capabilities make it an important potential supplier for countries seeking alternatives to highly concentrated global mineral markets.
The connection to artificial intelligence becomes clearer when considering the infrastructure required to run advanced computing facilities. Copper is important for electrical wiring and power distribution, while silicon is fundamental to semiconductor production. Other critical materials support specialized manufacturing, energy storage and equipment used across technology supply chains. Canada has also been investing in expanding its processing capabilities. In July 2026, Ottawa launched the $2-billion Canada Critical Minerals Accelerator to support strategically important projects. Nevertheless, having mineral deposits does not automatically translate into a reliable supply of finished industrial materials. Mining, refining, transportation and manufacturing capacity must all develop together, creating opportunities for partnerships that extend well beyond extraction alone.
The Technology Security Challenge Extends From Chips to Data Centres
Securing advanced artificial intelligence involves a complicated industrial network that stretches from mineral deposits to semiconductor factories and enormous computing facilities. The International Energy Agency’s 2026 Global Critical Minerals Outlook identifies growing concentration in mineral refining as a major economic-security risk, with China dominating several strategically important processing markets. Meanwhile, research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that just five economies accounted for approximately 87% of global semiconductor wafer-production capacity as of September 2025. This geographical concentration helps explain Washington’s interest in coordinating with trusted partners capable of supplying materials, equipment and specialized manufacturing expertise.
The economic stakes are also increasing rapidly. The International Energy Agency estimates that the world’s largest data-centre operators are on track to spend more than US$700 billion on capital expenditures in 2026, mostly associated with developing new facilities. These projects require enormous quantities of electrical equipment, reliable energy infrastructure and sophisticated computing hardware. A shortage of transformers, specialized components or processing capacity can delay projects even when financing is available. For Canada, the opportunity extends beyond selling minerals to American manufacturers. Canadian companies could potentially participate in processing, electricity infrastructure, equipment production and supporting services, making access to international technology partnerships increasingly valuable.
China’s Influence Is Driving Washington’s Security Strategy
China occupies a central position in the strategic concerns motivating Pax Silica. Beijing’s influence over mineral processing and advanced manufacturing supply chains has prompted Washington and several allies to reconsider the risks of depending heavily on a small number of suppliers. The International Energy Agency reported in 2026 that production growth for several refined minerals remained concentrated in China and Indonesia, reinforcing concerns about disruptions and trade restrictions. The Trump administration’s response has included efforts to encourage alternative suppliers, develop domestic processing capabilities and coordinate economic-security policies with governments that share its concerns.
The competition has also extended into international diplomacy. In August 2026, Reuters reported that American officials were preparing a draft warning to countries participating in U.S.-led AI cooperation about simultaneously joining a competing Chinese initiative. The draft illustrated Washington’s increasingly assertive approach, although its final implementation was not established in that report. China responded to the November 15 declaration the next day, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning arguing against dividing artificial intelligence cooperation into exclusive groups. For Canada, these developments highlight the difficult balance between maintaining access to major international markets and participating in security arrangements increasingly shaped by U.S.-China rivalry. They do not, however, establish that Canada’s omission was related to its own relationship with Beijing.
Canada Remains Involved in Other International Security Partnerships
Being absent from the San Francisco Declaration does not mean Canada has been excluded from every effort to strengthen critical-mineral security. In February 2026, Canada was among the countries represented at a major U.S.-hosted Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington. The gathering, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, brought together representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission to discuss mineral supply chains and international cooperation. Canada’s attendance demonstrates that Ottawa has remained involved in broader American-led discussions on strategically important resources, even while its status differs within the Pax Silica initiative.
Canada has also developed its own multilateral partnerships. During its 2025 G7 presidency, Ottawa helped establish the Critical Minerals Production Alliance, which was subsequently expanded into the Critical Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance in 2026. The initiative brings together partners to accelerate mineral projects and strengthen supply-chain security. Canada has also pursued bilateral critical-minerals cooperation with countries including Australia and India. These arrangements provide alternative channels for investment, policy coordination and industrial development. Nevertheless, they are not direct substitutes for participation in discussions specifically focused on securing advanced AI technologies and their underlying infrastructure.
The Participating Countries Bring Different Industrial Strengths
The declaration’s membership reflects the range of capabilities needed to build and protect modern technology supply chains. South Korea is a major producer of memory semiconductors, while Japan plays an important role in semiconductor manufacturing and specialized industrial materials. Australia contributes extensive mineral resources and has established a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, initially focused on antimony, gallium and rare earth elements. Singapore offers a major international shipping and logistics hub. Meanwhile, India, Israel and several Middle Eastern partners bring different combinations of technology expertise, industrial capacity, energy resources and potential investment. Together, these strengths help explain why Washington is pursuing cooperation across multiple countries rather than relying on a single supplier.
However, the agreement does not assign specific responsibilities, projects or funding commitments to individual signatories. Its importance may emerge through future cooperation among governments, manufacturers and investors. This is where Canada’s absence could become more consequential. Canadian producers have experience supplying materials to American industries, and the country possesses valuable resources that participating governments may need. Remaining outside the latest declaration does not prevent Canadian companies from doing business with those countries. Nevertheless, if future working groups establish preferred investment relationships, security standards or joint projects, having a direct voice in those discussions could provide practical advantages.
More Allies Could Join, Leaving Canada With an Important Decision
The initial group of ten governments may not remain unchanged for long. According to reporting published November 16, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the European Commission are expected to sign the San Francisco Declaration during the week of November 23. Those signatures had not yet been confirmed as of November 16. The anticipated European participation is noteworthy because some European governments had raised concerns about the agreement’s terminology, the breadth of its technology-security commitments and potential implications for regulatory independence. Their concerns illustrate that even countries interested in closer cooperation with Washington are examining the details carefully before making additional commitments.
For Canada, the immediate question is what role Ottawa intends to pursue as the initiative develops. Seeking clarification about participation, coordinating with existing G7 partners and advancing investment-ready mineral-processing projects are possible approaches, although none should be mistaken for a newly announced Canadian response. The declaration itself does not establish new tariffs, prohibit trade with Canada or impose binding restrictions on Canadian companies. Its longer-term effects will depend on what participating governments actually implement. For mining communities, manufacturers and technology investors, the stakes are practical: access to capital, dependable customers and the infrastructure needed to bring major projects into production. Canada’s absence is a notable diplomatic development, but its lasting significance remains to be determined.