Canada and the United States left the G20 trade ministers’ meeting in Milwaukee with their negotiating channel still open but no visible breakthrough on the disputes reshaping North American commerce. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed that technical discussions are continuing, while describing a handful of unresolved matters as “quite difficult to resolve.” Canadian International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu used the gathering to raise bilateral trade and World Trade Organization issues with Greer while also meeting other partners. The result was a familiar combination of contact and uncertainty: officials are still talking, but tariffs, import restrictions, automotive policy and the unresolved CUSMA review continue to hang over businesses on both sides of the border.
Milwaukee Produced Contact, Not a Settlement
The most important Canada-U.S. exchange in Milwaukee was not a formal negotiating round. Sidhu and Greer held what was described as a pull-aside conversation on the margins of the G20 meeting, where Sidhu raised bilateral trade and broader questions about the global trading system. Greer later told reporters that technical discussions between the two countries were continuing, but he offered no sign that negotiators had closed the remaining gaps. He also identified Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc as his principal Canadian counterpart and said they remain in regular contact.
That distinction matters. Continued communication means the relationship has not frozen, yet technical contact is not the same thing as political agreement. Greer’s description of the outstanding issues as difficult suggests the remaining problems are not simply drafting details waiting for lawyers to finish. The Milwaukee meeting therefore served more as a checkpoint than a reset. Canadian and American officials had another opportunity to speak directly, but neither government announced tariff relief, a new negotiating timetable or a framework that would settle the disputes now affecting goods trade and major industrial sectors.
The Dispute Now Extends Beyond a Single Tariff Fight
The negotiations are taking place against a much more complicated backdrop than a single tariff dispute. After the August breakdown in broader talks, Ottawa said Washington imposed 50 per cent tariffs on C$27.6 billion worth of Canadian goods. Canada answered with counter-tariffs covering the same value of U.S. imports, with rates of 15, 25 and 50 per cent depending on the product. Those Canadian measures took effect September 8 and cover categories including steel, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, plastics and electronics.
The United States has also moved beyond tariffs in selected areas. Presidential actions barred certain Canadian alcoholic beverages, dairy products and selected vehicle-related products from entering the U.S. beginning September 29. Washington has framed those actions as responses to what it describes as discriminatory Canadian treatment, while Ottawa has described the wider U.S. tariff measures as unjustified and has defended its countermeasures as a response intended to protect workers and strategic industries. Those competing explanations help show why a quick compromise has been elusive: both governments are now negotiating while enforcement measures and retaliation are already affecting real trade flows.
Autos Remain the Most Immediate Economic Flashpoint
Automobiles remain one of the clearest tests of whether the two governments can find a workable compromise. President Donald Trump has threatened to raise tariffs on Canadian cars, trucks and automotive parts to 50 per cent beginning January 1, 2027 if no agreement is reached. Greer was asked about that prospect in Milwaukee and emphasized the administration’s broader goal of bringing more manufacturing back to the United States rather than signalling that the threat had been withdrawn. Existing U.S. automotive tariffs already apply to the non-U.S. content of Canadian-built vehicles that qualify under CUSMA rules.
For Canada, the exposure is unusually concentrated. Federal figures say more than 90 per cent of Canadian-made vehicles and about 60 per cent of Canadian-made auto parts are exported to the United States, while the domestic auto manufacturing industry supports roughly 125,000 direct jobs. That means even a policy aimed at shifting final assembly can ripple quickly through parts makers, logistics networks and supplier communities. It also explains why automotive rules have become more than a narrow customs issue. For both countries, the argument reaches into investment decisions about where the next production line, parts contract or vehicle program will be placed.
CUSMA Is Still in Force, but Its Future Is Unresolved
The unresolved dispute is also sitting on top of the first formal review of CUSMA, known in the United States as USMCA. On July 1, the three countries conducted the agreement’s required six-year review. The United States declined to extend the pact for a new 16-year term in its current form, but that did not terminate the agreement. CUSMA remains in force, and its review mechanism allows the three governments to keep revisiting extension while negotiations continue. Canada’s official guidance describes the 2026 review as a scheduled check-in rather than an expiry date.
That legal structure is important because headlines about non-renewal can sound more final than the agreement itself allows. Under CUSMA’s review provisions, if all three parties do not agree to a new 16-year extension, annual joint reviews are required for the remainder of the existing term, which currently runs to 2036. The pact therefore remains the governing framework for a vast amount of continental commerce even as its future is being renegotiated. For Canadian exporters, that creates an unusual mix of continuity and uncertainty: the rules still exist, but the political commitment to preserve them unchanged does not.
Canada Is Expanding Other Trade Options While Keeping the U.S. Channel Open
Milwaukee also highlighted Canada’s effort to build more commercial options outside the United States. Sidhu scheduled or held meetings with counterparts from the European Union, India, Brazil, France, Australia and Turkey, while Canada continues work on initiatives involving digital trade, India and the Mercosur bloc. Ottawa’s broader strategy is to double non-U.S. exports over the next decade. That push predates the latest G20 meeting, but the widening tariff dispute has made diversification a more immediate economic priority rather than a long-term talking point.
The numbers show both the progress and the limits of that strategy. Statistics Canada reported that the United States still received 71.7 per cent of Canada’s merchandise exports in 2025, down from 75.9 per cent a year earlier. At the same time, Canadian merchandise exports to countries other than the United States rose 17.2 per cent in 2025. Those shifts demonstrate that alternative markets can grow meaningfully, but they also show why replacing American demand quickly would be difficult. Canada can expand trade with Europe, Asia and other regions while still remaining deeply tied to the enormous consumer and industrial market sitting directly across its border.
The G20’s Broader Results Were Limited Too
The wider G20 meeting produced its own mixed record, which mirrored some of the difficulty seen in the Canada-U.S. relationship. Trade ministers reached consensus on a statement opposing the coercive use of food and agricultural trade, but they did not reach broad agreement on several other U.S. priorities, including forced labour in supply chains and how to address structural industrial overcapacity. The United States had also used its G20 presidency to push discussion of the World Trade Organization’s most-favoured-nation principle, arguing that existing rules should be reconsidered as the global trading environment changes.
There was, however, a separate development on steel. The Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, meeting alongside the ministerial, adopted what U.S. officials called the Milwaukee Framework. Reuters reported that 28 market-oriented economies backed the approach, which encourages stronger trade remedies and less support for uneconomic steel capacity. That outcome should not be confused with a full G20 consensus: China and India are not members of that forum, and broader G20 agreement on industrial overcapacity remained elusive. Milwaukee therefore produced some targeted cooperation, but not agreement across all of the trade priorities Washington had placed on the agenda.
The Next Deadlines Keep Pressure on Both Governments
The next phase will be shaped less by one summit headline than by a series of approaching pressure points. The United States is scheduled to host G20 leaders in Miami on December 14 and 15, giving both governments another high-level venue before the threatened January 1 increase in U.S. automotive tariffs. At the same time, CUSMA remains in force without a new 16-year extension, meaning the trade relationship is being managed through ongoing technical contacts, bilateral political conversations and a review process that can continue annually.
For businesses, the practical issue is predictability. Neither Greer nor Sidhu announced a settlement in Milwaukee, and no public timetable was set for resolving the handful of issues Greer described as especially difficult. That leaves companies making investment, sourcing and hiring decisions while tariffs and import restrictions are already in place and additional measures remain possible. The Milwaukee meeting confirmed that dialogue continues; it did not establish when that dialogue will produce a deal. Until the two governments narrow the remaining differences, the Canada-U.S. commercial relationship will continue to operate under rules that are still functioning but increasingly contested.
