For years, an Edmonton businessman built a record as a government supplier, winning contracts from federal departments ranging from National Defence to the RCMP. At the same time, Canadian security authorities were examining a very different part of his history.
Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard, who has conducted business in Canada as Sal or Salman Ghafouri, is the son of former Iranian vice-president Hassan Ghafouri Fard. Newly disclosed records described by Global News show that Canadian intelligence alleged he had previously worked on military technology and procurement connected to Iran’s armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Ghafouri strongly disputes that he poses a security threat. Yet public procurement records show companies he founded continued receiving Canadian government business while security concerns surrounding his citizenship file remained active.
The Public Contract Trail Goes Beyond $2 Million
The federal government’s own contract database provides the clearest numerical picture. Six records currently returned for Melanite Group show contract values totaling roughly $2.14 million. Four additional federal records for Radian Group total about $270,700. Together, the searchable federal records amount to approximately $2.41 million in contract values associated with the two Edmonton companies. That figure does not include every provincial or other public-sector transaction the companies may have received.
There is an important qualification. Ottawa warns that proactively disclosed contract values can represent the maximum potential value of an award and do not necessarily equal the amount ultimately spent. Even with that caveat, the scale is substantial for relatively small suppliers. Melanite’s federal awards ranged from a roughly $50,000 National Defence contract in 2024 to a $1.43-million defence award dated December 2021. The records establish that Ghafouri’s companies were not occasional vendors; they had an established government procurement history.
An Edmonton Entrepreneur With an Unusually Complex Background
Ghafouri returned to Canada as a permanent resident in 2013 and later established Melanite Group. Radian Group followed in 2018. Federal procurement records list the companies at the same Edmonton-area business address, while Global News reported that Alberta corporate records identify Ghafouri as their sole director. Government records use variations including Sal Ghafouri, while immigration and corporate materials cited in the reporting identify him as Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard.
His Canadian public profile looked markedly different from the security concerns developing behind the scenes. An Edmonton Region Immigrant Employment Council feature published in 2020 portrayed Salman Ghafouri as an immigrant entrepreneur mentoring another newcomer and describing his progression from struggling to find professional employment to becoming a business owner. That ordinary community-business narrative helps explain why the case is striking. On the surface, his companies competed for contracts, challenged procurement decisions and supplied equipment to Canadian institutions in much the same way as other small vendors.
Security Concerns Had Emerged Years Earlier
The procurement history overlapped with a separate immigration-security process. According to government documents obtained by Global News, Ghafouri applied for Canadian citizenship roughly four years after arriving as a permanent resident. His application was subsequently suspended after a Canada Border Services Agency intelligence unit raised national-security concerns. The reporting says he had been flagged by immigration investigators by 2017, years before several of his largest government contracts were awarded.
The file did not disappear after the initial flag. Records described by Global News show that elected officials who inquired about the delayed citizenship application were told security verifications remained underway. By 2021, national-security officials had concluded there might be grounds to refuse citizenship on security grounds. CSIS later completed a security-screening report dated January 13, 2023. That timeline is central to the controversy because federal procurement awards continued during the same broad period, including the largest Melanite contract disclosed in Ottawa’s database.
CSIS Alleged Work on Iranian Military Technology
The most serious claims concern Ghafouri’s employment in Iran before his permanent move to Canada. A recently declassified CSIS security-screening report, made public through court proceedings and reviewed by Global News, alleged that he worked for approximately four years at Rabi Kosar, an Iranian engineering company involved in military research and development. The intelligence service alleged his work contributed to technologies intended for Iran’s military and the IRGC.
Among the projects identified by CSIS was Shahin, connected to Iran’s Mersad air-defence system. The report also described work involving RAAD, an electronic-warfare system, and SINA, a direction-finding technology with military applications. CSIS further alleged that Rabi Kosar supplied equipment through SA Iran, described in the intelligence report as linked to Iran’s Ministry of Defence. These are intelligence allegations rather than judicial findings against Ghafouri. His position is that he is not a threat to Canada, and his lawyer says he strongly disputes the government’s allegations.
The Procurement Allegations Are Particularly Sensitive
CSIS did not restrict its concerns to engineering work. Its report alleged that Ghafouri was moved into a procurement role that helped Rabi Kosar obtain foreign components that were difficult for Iranian military programs to acquire because of international restrictions. According to the intelligence account, requirements would be passed through a contact in Malaysia who sourced components from third countries, including the United States.
That allegation carries particular significance because Ghafouri later built Canadian businesses whose core activity included government procurement. It does not establish that his Canadian companies participated in sanctions evasion or illegal exports, and no such conclusion should be inferred from the public contract records. The concern is instead about past experience alleged by CSIS. The agency said Ghafouri had participated in procurement benefiting Iran’s military, including the IRGC. Ghafouri has challenged the broader national-security case against him, meaning those claims remain disputed rather than finally adjudicated.
CSIS Also Raised Questions About Meetings in Iran
The security report described another episode after Ghafouri had become a Canadian permanent resident. According to CSIS, he returned to Iran in 2015 and met twice with representatives of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The report alleged that during one meeting he discussed his Canadian employment and was questioned about travel to the United States and possible contact with Canadian or American intelligence services.
CSIS further alleged that a later meeting included warnings about how to respond if police or intelligence agencies approached him in Canada and advice against travelling to the United States. Those claims are important because they concern conduct after his move to Canada, rather than only employment dating from years earlier in Iran. But the same caution applies: the information comes from an intelligence security-screening assessment disclosed during ongoing proceedings. Ghafouri disputes the contention that he represents a security threat and has pursued legal avenues challenging the handling of his case.
National Defence Was One of the Biggest Customers
The government procurement records show significant dealings with National Defence. Melanite received a contract valued at approximately $1.43 million in December 2021 for equipment and parts. Earlier Melanite records include a roughly $103,500 defence contract in 2020. Radian Group received a National Defence contract worth approximately $106,980 in 2019 and another worth about $55,800 connected to CFB Shilo.
Other agencies also appear in the records. Melanite received a roughly $68,400 RCMP contract in 2019 and an approximately $104,600 Correctional Service of Canada award. A 2021 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada contract eventually carried a total value of about $380,400. Global News reported that contracts involved items ranging from imaging equipment and vehicle-related components to lifts and other industrial goods. Many were competitively sourced, showing that the companies were participating through ordinary federal bidding mechanisms rather than receiving all of the business through sole-source arrangements.
Government Business Continued After the CSIS Report
The timeline did not end when CSIS completed its January 2023 assessment. Open Government records show Melanite received another National Defence contract dated June 18, 2024, valued at $50,285 for road motor vehicles, with the disclosed description referring to Borden, Ontario. Global News also reported that Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada provided Melanite with a $15,000 grant in 2024 aimed at adopting new technologies.
That continuing federal relationship is one of the hardest parts of the story for government to explain publicly. By then, the security concerns were not simply a newly opened file: the citizenship process had been delayed for years, and CSIS had completed a formal security-screening assessment. None of that automatically made Ghafouri or his companies ineligible to compete for ordinary government contracts. Still, the overlap illustrates how one arm of government could maintain serious national-security concerns while another continued conducting routine commercial transactions with companies controlled by the same individual.
Procurement Screening Is Not the Same as Immigration Screening
The apparent contradiction does not necessarily mean procurement officials possessed the same intelligence available to CSIS or immigration authorities. Public Services and Procurement Canada’s rules distinguish contracts that contain security requirements from ordinary procurements. Organizations bidding on contracts involving protected or classified information, sensitive assets or restricted sites can be required to undergo screening through the federal Contract Security Program. Departments identify those requirements when designing the procurement.
That distinction matters. A contract to supply commercially available equipment does not automatically trigger the same investigative process used when someone requires access to classified military plans or protected government information. Nor does an unresolved citizenship-security investigation automatically amount to a procurement ban. The case therefore exposes a broader policy question: when serious security concerns exist elsewhere in government, what information should procurement authorities receive about vendors? University of Ottawa professor Thomas Juneau told Global News the case illustrated problems created by institutional silos, while acknowledging that separating processes can also protect fairness.
Ghafouri Is Fighting the Government’s Security Case
Ghafouri has not accepted the government’s characterization of his past. His lawyer, Bjorna Shkurti, told Global News that he has lived in Canada for more than a decade, has undergone multiple security screenings and strongly disputes the allegations against him. Court materials cited in the reporting say Ghafouri maintains that he answered CSIS questions truthfully, contributed to Canadian society and does not constitute a security threat.
The legal history is complicated. Global News reported that CBSA once moved toward deportation proceedings based on concerns connected to Ghafouri’s employment in Iran but later withdrew that process because required evidence could not be used. In May 2026, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada informed him it was moving to deny citizenship on grounds that he represented a threat to Canada’s security. Ghafouri, meanwhile, has sought relief over delays in his citizenship case. No final judgment establishing the intelligence allegations as proven fact was identified in the public material reviewed for this piece.
Canada Has Since Hardened Its Position Toward the IRGC
The case is unfolding against a much tougher Canadian policy toward Tehran than existed when Ghafouri became a permanent resident. In November 2022, Canada formally designated Iran as a regime engaged in terrorism and systematic or gross human-rights violations for immigration purposes. The measure made tens of thousands of senior regime officials, including many senior IRGC members, potentially inadmissible to Canada.
Canada went further on June 19, 2024, when it listed the entire IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code. By August 4, 2026, CBSA said 51 people had been reported inadmissible based on membership in the IRGC since the listing. Those measures do not by themselves determine Ghafouri’s case, and the government’s allegations concern his own activities rather than merely his father’s political career. But they help explain why contracts awarded during years of active security scrutiny now draw greater attention. The unresolved question is how effectively Canada connects national-security information with the ordinary machinery through which public money is awarded.
