Canada’s effort to redraw its trade map could soon bring Prime Minister Mark Carney back to Ankara, this time for a visit focused specifically on Canada-Turkey relations. Reuters reported on October 2 that Carney plans to travel to Turkey later this month for talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, citing four sources familiar with the plans. The trip has not yet been formally announced, and neither leader’s office had confirmed dates or an agenda when Reuters published its report.
If it proceeds, the visit would add momentum to a relationship already moving quickly. Canada and Turkey launched free-trade negotiations in July, while energy, nuclear technology, aerospace and defence have all emerged as possible areas of deeper cooperation. For Ottawa, the broader goal is clear: build substantially more trade outside the United States without pretending its largest economic relationship can simply be replaced.
The Visit Would Be More Significant Than a Routine Diplomatic Stop
Reuters reported that the planned trip would potentially become the first dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey by a Canadian prime minister. That distinction matters because Canadian leaders have met Turkish presidents at international gatherings before, including NATO and G20 meetings. Carney himself was in Ankara in July for the 2026 NATO Summit, where he met Erdoğan. A return devoted specifically to the bilateral relationship would therefore represent a different level of diplomatic attention, particularly if business, energy and trade negotiations dominate the agenda.
There is still an important qualifier. Reuters’ sources did not disclose firm dates or a final agenda, and the offices of Carney and Erdoğan did not immediately confirm the visit when contacted by the news organization. What is confirmed is the groundwork. At their July 7 meeting, the two leaders discussed defence industrial capacity, critical minerals, energy, aerospace and advanced technologies while formally launching negotiations for a comprehensive free-trade agreement. A dedicated trip would move those conversations from the margins of a NATO summit toward a much more deliberate economic partnership.
Canada’s Search for New Markets Is Already Showing Up in the Trade Numbers
The strategic reason for Ottawa’s diversification push is visible in Canada’s trade statistics. The United States remains overwhelmingly Canada’s largest export customer, but its share has been falling. Statistics Canada reported that 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports went to the United States in 2025, down from 75.9% in 2024. Exports to the U.S. declined 5.8% for the year, while Canadian exports to countries outside the United States increased 17.2%. Those numbers do not suggest the American market is becoming unimportant; they show how much room Canada has to broaden its customer base.
The trend continued in 2026. In July, Canadian merchandise exports outside the United States rose 7.4% to a record $25.6 billion, representing 33.7% of all merchandise exports that month. Exports to the U.S., meanwhile, fell 6.6%. Carney has repeatedly set a goal of doubling Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the coming decade, which his government has described as roughly $300 billion in additional orders for Canadian resources, products and expertise. Turkey is only one market, but Ottawa’s strategy depends on accumulating many such relationships rather than finding one replacement for the United States.
Free-Trade Negotiations With Turkey Are Moving Faster Than They Were a Few Months Ago
Canada and Turkey did not suddenly begin discussing trade because of a possible October visit. The process has been building throughout 2026. International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu and Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat agreed in June to begin exploratory discussions toward a free-trade agreement. Carney and Erdoğan then formally launched negotiations on July 7 during the NATO Summit. The Canadian government subsequently held public consultations from July 31 through September 14, collecting input from companies, industry associations, provinces, territories and other stakeholders.
Reuters reported that Canadian and Turkish trade ministers agreed this week to accelerate the negotiations ahead of the expected leaders’ meeting. That does not mean an agreement is about to be signed. Canada’s official trade page still describes the Canada-Turkey agreement as being “in negotiations,” and the July announcement said technical teams would first have to determine the scope and ambition of a potential deal before formal negotiating rounds progressed. Even so, political involvement from both leaders could shorten the distance between exploratory diplomacy and detailed bargaining over tariffs, investment rules, market access and other commercial issues.
Turkey Is Still a Small Canadian Trading Partner — Which Is Part of the Opportunity
The current commercial relationship remains modest beside Canada’s enormous cross-border trade with the United States. Reuters, citing Statistics Canada data, reported that Canada-Turkey merchandise trade totalled about C$4.34 billion in 2025, representing less than 0.3% of Canada’s overall merchandise trade. By comparison, Canadian merchandise trade with the United States was roughly C$1 trillion. That gap illustrates why even a successful trade agreement with Turkey would represent diversification rather than anything resembling a replacement for Canada’s U.S. relationship.
There is nevertheless an established foundation to build on. Global Affairs Canada reported more than C$4.3 billion in two-way merchandise trade in 2024, including roughly C$1.3 billion in Canadian exports and C$3.1 billion in imports from Turkey. Canadian agricultural products have already found substantial demand there: lentils and chickpeas accounted for C$393 million in Canadian exports in 2024, while iron and steel scrap reached C$167 million and soybeans C$113 million. Reuters reported that more recent Canadian exports also include aircraft and electronics, while imports include medical equipment, aircraft engines and other manufactured goods. A trade agreement could therefore build on several industries rather than beginning from zero.
Nuclear Energy Could Become One of the Most Valuable Parts of the Relationship
Energy cooperation may ultimately prove more consequential than the headline merchandise-trade numbers suggest. When the Canadian and Turkish trade ministers met in June, they specifically identified renewable and nuclear energy as areas where cooperation could expand. The Canadian statement highlighted the possibility of CANDU nuclear technology supporting Turkey’s energy diversification plans, putting a major Canadian engineering capability directly into the bilateral economic conversation.
Reuters reported that Turkey has been holding discussions with Canadian engineering company AtkinsRéalis, South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation and China’s State Power Investment Corporation as it considers technology for additional nuclear power plants. Russia’s Rosatom is constructing Turkey’s first nuclear station, while Ankara has been evaluating options for subsequent projects. An AtkinsRéalis executive previously told Reuters that the company expected Turkish authorities to complete an early review of its CANDU technology after an exchange of technical information. That remains a potential opportunity rather than a confirmed reactor contract, an important distinction. Still, a nuclear project would involve long-term engineering, technology and supply relationships on a scale far larger than an ordinary export order, explaining why energy could feature prominently in future high-level discussions.
Defence Cooperation Shows How Much Canada-Turkey Relations Have Changed
Defence is another area where the relationship has shifted substantially. During Carney’s July meeting with Erdoğan, the two leaders discussed strengthening NATO’s defence industrial capacity and expanding cooperation in areas including aerospace and advanced technology. Reuters also reported that Turkey agreed in July to participate as one of the founding countries in Canada’s proposed Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, an initiative intended to mobilize financing for defence and security investment among participating partners.
That cooperation would have been much more difficult only a few years ago. Canada had maintained a presumptive-denial policy for applications involving exports of military items to Turkey. Global Affairs Canada removed that policy on January 29, 2024 after years of discussions with Ankara over export controls and commitments involving the potential transfer or re-export of Canadian technology. The change did not create unrestricted military trade. Applications are now reviewed individually under Canada’s export-control and risk-assessment framework, including Arms Trade Treaty criteria, and certain Turkish government or military end users require additional assurances. The history makes today’s defence discussions commercially significant but politically sensitive.
Turkey Offers Canadian Companies More Than Access to One Domestic Market
Turkey’s appeal is partly geographic and industrial. Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service describes it as both an emerging strategic market and a member of the European Union Customs Union, with potential opportunities for Canadian companies across aerospace, agriculture and processed foods, clean technology, information technology, life sciences and mining. That mix overlaps closely with sectors the Canadian government has been highlighting in its broader diversification campaign.
Physical connectivity has also improved. A year-round direct Air Transat service between Toronto and Istanbul began in December 2025, operating twice weekly. An interline arrangement with Turkish Airlines was designed to connect travellers through Istanbul to more than 300 destinations across the Middle East, Asia and Africa. For tourists, that means easier travel. For businesses, direct passenger and cargo links can make regular commercial relationships considerably more practical. Canadian trade officials are also promoting participation in Turkish aerospace and defence events, including the 2026 International Astronautical Congress in Antalya and NATO Edge in Izmir. Taken together, those developments show that Ottawa increasingly views Turkey not simply as another export destination but as a commercial platform connected to several neighbouring regions.
Closer Economic Ties Will Still Bring Difficult Political Questions
A more pragmatic relationship with Ankara will not eliminate disagreements over democratic rights and civil liberties. Reuters noted that Erdoğan’s government has faced longstanding criticism from rights organizations over its treatment of political opponents. More recently, Turkish authorities launched a broad operation against LGBTQ+ organizations and activists. Human Rights Watch said coordinated September raids targeted rights groups and organizations supporting people living with HIV, with numerous people arrested or detained. Turkish authorities have said the wider operation is intended to protect children and family values, while rights organizations argue that it threatens freedom of association and expression.
That creates a larger test for Carney’s diversification strategy. Building economic links with a wider range of countries inevitably means dealing with governments whose domestic policies do not always align with Canadian positions. Ottawa still maintains legal safeguards around sensitive exports, including individual assessments of controlled military technology. Economically, meanwhile, the scale of Canada-Turkey trade makes another point clear: Turkey alone cannot materially replace the United States. The more realistic measure of success would be whether a visit produces tangible movement on the trade agreement, energy investments, defence cooperation and commercial contracts. Canada’s diversification strategy is ultimately a portfolio approach, and Turkey could become one increasingly important piece of it.
