The next contest for Asian energy customers is taking shape on North America’s Pacific coast. President Donald Trump says Taiwan will buy 30% of the output from the proposed Alaska LNG project, giving a long-discussed U.S. export venture a potentially enormous customer.
Taiwan confirms plans to purchase six million tonnes of gas annually and invest up to US$4.4 billion, but final commercial terms remain under negotiation. Meanwhile, Canada is already shipping liquefied natural gas from British Columbia and has approved a major expansion.
What looks like a single gas announcement is also a race over billions in construction spending, long-term supply contracts and the routes Asian economies will rely upon for energy security.
Trump’s Announcement Was More Definite Than Taiwan’s Response
Speaking at a campaign rally in Wasilla, Alaska, on October 13, President Donald Trump said Taiwan had agreed to buy 30% of the gas from the proposed Alaska LNG project for the next 20 years. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick also pointed to a US$4.4-billion Taiwanese investment. Trump presented the arrangement as a major victory for Alaska, where a long-discussed pipeline has become an economic and political priority. The announcement suggested a breakthrough for a project that has spent years searching for customers and financing.
Taiwan’s response on October 14 was deliberately more measured. Its Ministry of Economic Affairs said state-owned CPC Corporation had made significant progress with the U.S. developer after nearly 18 months of negotiations, building on a letter of intent signed in March 2025. The ministry described the purchases and investment as plans, with ownership stakes, financing arrangements and specific terms still subject to further negotiations and commercial procedures. It did not confirm a completed, binding 20-year gas sales contract. That distinction matters when assessing how close the project is to construction.
Six Million Tonnes Would Be a Major Purchase for Taiwan
Alaska LNG is designed to export 20 million metric tonnes of liquefied natural gas annually. Taiwan’s proposed purchase of six million tonnes would therefore represent exactly 30% of the planned export capacity, explaining the figure cited by Trump. For perspective, Taiwan imported approximately 23.8 million tonnes of LNG in 2025, according to shipping-data provider Kpler as reported by Reuters. Six million tonnes would equal roughly one-quarter of that historical import total, although Taiwan’s demand could change substantially before any Alaska deliveries begin.
The purchase would give state-owned CPC a potentially significant new supply source alongside established suppliers, particularly Australia and Qatar. Taiwan has also discussed raising the U.S. share of its overall LNG purchases to around one-third, but that is a separate objective from taking 30% of one Alaskan project. A contract covering millions of tonnes year after year can shape electricity planning, procurement budgets and shipping schedules. For Taiwan, however, future availability and contract flexibility will be as important as the headline volume.
The US$4.4-Billion Investment Is Not Yet a Blank Cheque
Taiwan’s ministry put potential investment in Alaska LNG at up to US$4.4 billion, rather than describing an unconditional transfer of money. It said CPC must still determine the structure, equity participation and commercial conditions through subsequent talks. Those details will influence how much financial risk Taiwan assumes, what rights it gains as an investor and how its gas purchase price might be calculated. A government endorsement can encourage negotiations without replacing the contracts and approvals needed to commit capital.
Project developer Glenfarne has reported preliminary sales arrangements covering about 13 million tonnes annually, including interest from buyers in Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan, as well as France’s TotalEnergies. It is targeting agreements for 16 million tonnes, or 80% of capacity, to support financing. That leaves roughly three million tonnes still to arrange, and preliminary letters must be converted into binding commitments. Washington has also touted major South Korean investment, but Seoul has emphasized that commercial viability still requires examination. Supportive announcements are not the same as financial close.
Alaska’s Pipeline Would Be Among the Project’s Biggest Hurdles
To turn North Slope gas into export cargoes, the project needs an approximately 807-mile pipeline running south to Nikiski, along with a gas treatment plant and a coastal liquefaction facility. Developer Glenfarne estimates the complete undertaking could cost US$44.5 billion to US$54.5 billion. Reuters reported that its capital requirement per tonne of annual output could be more than twice that of recent U.S. Gulf Coast projects. Alaska’s geography creates a short ocean route to Asia, but the gas must first cross a vast and difficult land corridor.
Glenfarne proposes separating the work into an initial phase focused on a pipeline that could also supply Alaskan users, followed by the export facilities. The developer has targeted an investment decision for the pipeline in 2026 and for the LNG terminal in 2027, with first exports potentially in 2031. Taiwan’s ministry has indicated 2032 as the earliest possible year for its deliveries. Those dates are development goals, not fixed shipping schedules. Financing, construction execution and regulatory requirements could still change them.
Energy Security Is Making Pacific Gas More Attractive
Taiwan’s interest goes beyond the cost of a cargo. Its economy relies on imported energy, and the island bought most of its LNG from Australia and Qatar in 2025. The proposed Alaskan route would connect a new supplier directly across the Pacific, reducing dependence on some longer routes and giving buyers another way to handle disruptions. Taiwan’s government specifically cited geographic diversification and greater flexibility in managing its gas supply when explaining the negotiations.
Recent world events illustrate that concern. The International Energy Agency reported that the Middle East conflict severely disrupted shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway that previously carried almost one-fifth of global LNG supply. In the second quarter of 2026, the agency estimated Asian spot LNG prices averaged about US$17.50 per million British thermal units, up 45% from a year earlier. More secure sources can therefore command attention even when they are expensive to build. Yet a route avoiding one chokepoint does not eliminate construction, market or geopolitical risk.
Canada Already Has a Working Pacific Export Gateway
For Canada, the most important difference is timing. LNG Canada shipped its first cargo from Kitimat, British Columbia, on June 30, 2025, becoming the country’s first large-scale LNG export facility. The initial two processing trains provide 14 million tonnes of annual nameplate capacity. Unlike Alaska LNG, its customers do not have to wait for a proposed transcontinental pipeline and an unbuilt terminal before deliveries can begin. Canadian LNG is already moving from the Pacific Coast toward overseas markets.
Statistics Canada’s September 29 release showed exports of Canadian natural gas to countries outside the United States, in LNG form, more than tripled in July 2026 compared with July 2025. The agency said the growth was mainly associated with Asian markets and coincided with lower pipeline exports to the United States. For producers in British Columbia and Alberta, the coastal terminal creates a new route to global buyers. It also gives Canada an operating track record to present when competing for long-term Asian business.
Canada Has Already Approved a Major LNG Expansion
Canada’s competitive position changed again on September 28, 2026, when the LNG Canada joint venture approved its Phase 2 expansion. Two additional processing trains are planned, raising total nameplate capacity from 14 million to 28 million tonnes annually. Shell, PETRONAS, PetroChina, Mitsubishi and Korea Gas Corporation are the project’s five investors. Shell expects commercial operations from the expansion in the early 2030s, creating a potentially significant overlap with Alaska LNG’s proposed export timeline.
Expanding the plant also requires more transport capacity inland. LNG Canada says work with Coastal GasLink will add five compressor stations to the existing 670-kilometre pipeline, alongside a new storage tank, loading berth and other site infrastructure. The company expects thousands of construction roles, but those are project forecasts rather than jobs already created. This is more than a proposal waiting for its first investment decision: the expansion has passed that major financial milestone. However, more construction and operational work is still required before the extra 14 million tonnes can reach buyers.
Other Canadian Terminals Are Competing for Future Contracts
LNG Canada is not the only project competing for a larger Pacific market. Cedar LNG, a majority Indigenous-owned development backed by the Haisla Nation and Pembina, made a final investment decision in 2024. Its floating terminal near Kitimat is designed to export 3.3 million tonnes annually, with developers targeting service in 2028. Woodfibre LNG, under construction near Squamish, is designed for 2.1 million tonnes a year and is scheduled for completion in 2027. Both would add export options if commissioning proceeds as expected.
Farther north, the Nisga’a-led Ksi Lisims LNG project proposes up to 12 million tonnes annually. Its developer reported signed sales agreements for six million tonnes with Shell, TotalEnergies and Uniper, while a September arrangement with Australia’s Santos concerns a further one million tonnes but remains subject to a definitive sales contract. Canada’s northern projects face their own financing, permitting and infrastructure challenges; they should not all be counted as operating capacity. Nevertheless, they show that Canada is assembling more than one route into the Asian LNG trade.
Both Countries Have a Shipping Advantage Over the Gulf Coast
Alaska and British Columbia share an attraction for Asian buyers: their Pacific ports can send LNG across the ocean without using the Panama Canal or sailing from the U.S. Gulf Coast on a much longer route. Shorter passages may reduce shipping time, fuel consumption and exposure to certain bottlenecks. That is particularly valuable when tanker markets tighten or conflicts interrupt normal maritime traffic. TotalEnergies has explicitly pointed to Alaska’s location as a reason for pursuing preliminary volumes from the project.
Geography alone will not decide the competition. Buyers compare the total cost of delivered gas, which includes production, processing, liquefaction, shipping and sometimes the terms of long-term price formulas. Reuters has highlighted Alaska’s unusually high development costs, while its proponents argue that a direct Pacific connection provides a premium security benefit. Canada’s existing Kitimat infrastructure offers a different argument: some capital has already been spent and gas is already reaching ships. There is no verified blanket rule that every Canadian cargo will be cheaper than an Alaskan one.
Indigenous Partnerships and Emissions Will Shape Canada’s Pitch
Canada’s LNG expansion is also reshaping who participates in major energy infrastructure. LNG Canada’s Phase 2 decision enables an option for investment of up to C$1 billion by an entity representing economic development organizations from five neighbouring First Nations. Cedar LNG is majority-owned by the Haisla Nation, while Ksi Lisims is led in partnership with the Nisga’a Nation. These arrangements create potential revenue, employment and decision-making roles beyond conventional construction contracts, although communities still face important environmental and land-use questions.
Several British Columbia developers propose using provincial hydroelectricity rather than gas-powered equipment to reduce emissions from the liquefaction process. Cedar and Ksi Lisims have made particularly strong claims about their expected operational carbon performance. Those claims should be distinguished from independent measurements of a completed project and from the full emissions associated with producing, transporting and ultimately burning gas. Asian customers considering long-term supply may weigh emissions alongside price and reliability. For Canada, responsible project delivery has become part of the commercial proposition.
The Race Will Be Decided by Contracts, Construction and Demand
The clearest near-term test for Alaska LNG is whether CPC and the other prospective buyers finalize binding purchase agreements and whether Glenfarne secures investment decisions for the pipeline and terminal. Taiwan still has to settle the size and terms of its ownership stake, and construction schedules must become deliverable milestones. Canada faces a different checklist: keeping existing exports reliable, building LNG Canada Phase 2, and bringing Cedar, Woodfibre and other proposed projects into service on their stated schedules.
Neither country can assume Asian demand will rise without interruption. The International Energy Agency expects global natural gas consumption to contract by around 0.5% in 2026 because high prices and disrupted supplies have discouraged use. Renewable power and changing industrial demand add uncertainty over the next decade. That makes competition for dependable buyers more consequential, not less. Trump’s announcement gives Alaska LNG political momentum, but Canada already has the advantage of actual Pacific shipments and an approved expansion. The ultimate winner will be determined by delivered price, dependable supply and completed investments—not announcements alone.
