Canada’s defence relationship with the United States is not disappearing, but the buying pattern around it is beginning to change. A Reuters special report published September 17 found Canada among at least eight NATO members exploring ways to reduce their dependence on American weapons, technology and defence companies as questions grow about Washington’s long-term reliability.
For Ottawa, that shift is showing up in billion-dollar radar programs, European aerospace partnerships and a new strategy designed to steer more military spending toward Canadian companies. Yet the transformation is far from complete. Canada remains deeply integrated with the United States through NORAD, the F-35 program, missile purchases and cross-border defence supply chains. What is emerging instead is a more diversified model: still allied with Washington, but increasingly determined to have other choices.
Canada’s Procurement Shift Is Becoming Visible
Reuters’ investigation found that Canada, Poland, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Türkiye, France and Germany are all exploring ways to reduce some of their dependence on U.S. military technology and suppliers. In Canada’s case, the change is particularly significant because the country has spent decades building its defence architecture around extraordinary levels of integration with the United States. NORAD is binational, Canadian and American personnel routinely serve alongside one another, and the two countries operate deeply interconnected defence-industry supply chains. That history makes the recent procurement moves more consequential than a simple change of vendors.
The key distinction is that Ottawa is diversifying rather than severing the relationship. Reuters reported that Canadian officials have received mixed signals from the Pentagon over the move toward other suppliers. At the same time, Canada continues purchasing American equipment. The Canadian government signed an agreement in January 2026 for 26 Lockheed Martin HIMARS launchers, associated missiles, training and support, with an estimated acquisition cost of up to C$2.6 billion. The contrast captures the emerging policy: American systems remain important where they meet Canadian requirements, but the United States is no longer automatically the only place Ottawa intends to look.
An Australian Radar Deal Shows What Diversification Looks Like
One of the clearest examples sits in Canada’s Arctic surveillance plans. In June, Canada formalized agreements with Australia and BAE Systems Australia for an Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar capability based on technology developed through Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network. The Canadian government says the radar will allow the military to detect and track threats approaching North America through the Arctic at far greater distances than conventional systems. Procurement of the radar itself represents a C$2.5-billion commitment, while the broader program, including infrastructure, integration and installation, is valued at more than C$6 billion. Initial capability is targeted for December 2029.
Reuters described the procurement as a choice of an Australian system over an American competitor and reported that delivery speed played an important part in the decision. A former senior Canadian official involved in the process told Reuters the Pentagon had supported the Australian choice because the system could be delivered years sooner than the U.S. alternative. That detail complicates any simple narrative that Canada is rejecting American suppliers for political reasons alone. Strategic autonomy matters, but so do schedules, industrial benefits and operational requirements. Ottawa’s emerging procurement model is increasingly willing to combine those factors rather than treating U.S. sourcing as the default.
Saab’s GlobalEye Deal Moves Another Major Program Away From a U.S. Supplier
Canada made another notable move in May when the Defence Investment Agency selected Sweden’s Saab as the preferred supplier for the country’s planned Airborne Early Warning and Control capability. Saab’s GlobalEye combines Swedish surveillance and mission systems with the Bombardier Global 6500 business jet manufactured in Canada. The aircraft would give the Royal Canadian Air Force a new long-range airborne command-and-surveillance capability intended in part to strengthen Arctic awareness and Canada’s contribution to NORAD. Ottawa stresses that preferred-supplier status still requires commercial and technical negotiations and does not by itself constitute a final contract.
The competitive context makes the choice important. Reuters reported that Boeing’s American-made E-7 Wedgetail had also been under consideration. The GlobalEye decision therefore directs another strategically important surveillance program toward a European supplier while keeping a major portion of the platform rooted in Canadian aerospace manufacturing. Saab is expected to work with Bombardier and Canadian companies on production, integration and technology-transfer opportunities. It is exactly the sort of procurement Ottawa increasingly emphasizes: equipment from a trusted ally, integration with Canadian industry and less concentration of critical technology in a single foreign supply chain. NATO itself has also moved toward Saab’s GlobalEye for replacing its aging U.S.-built AWACS aircraft.
The F-35 Remains the Biggest Test of How Far Canada Will Go
No procurement carries more symbolism—or greater operational consequences—than Canada’s fighter fleet. Ottawa originally planned to acquire 88 F-35A fighters through an arrangement with the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin. Prime Minister Mark Carney ordered a review in March 2025, and the government continues to say that review is examining operational requirements, NORAD and NATO obligations, industrial benefits, strategic partnerships and possible alternatives. Canada nevertheless remains committed to its initial aircraft, and preparations for introducing the F-35 into service are continuing.
The financial and industrial stakes are enormous. Government documents put the current acquisition budget at C$27.7 billion, while more than 110 Canadian companies have received billions of dollars in F-35-related contracts over the program’s history. Reuters reported that Ottawa is also considering whether Swedish-built Gripen fighters could form part of its future fleet, while Canada’s Defence Ministry said in September that no decision had yet been made on purchases beyond the initial F-35 batch. That uncertainty makes the fighter review the clearest test of diversification. Radar and surveillance aircraft can be sourced elsewhere relatively cleanly; changing the composition of the fighter fleet would touch training, infrastructure, weapons, maintenance, NORAD integration and decades of industrial participation.
Ottawa Wants More Defence Money to Stay in Canada
Diversification is also being driven by economics. Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy, announced in February 2026, formalizes a “Build-Partner-Buy” approach. The idea is straightforward: build domestically where Canada already has or can develop strategic capability, partner with trusted allies where cooperation makes sense, and purchase abroad when necessary. The government has set an ambition of raising the share of defence acquisitions awarded to Canadian firms to 70%, while also expanding defence exports and domestic industrial capacity over the next decade.
Those targets matter because Canada is preparing for defence spending on a scale that would have seemed unlikely only a few years ago. NATO members agreed in 2025 to work toward defence and security-related investment equivalent to 5% of GDP by 2035, divided between 3.5% for core military requirements and as much as 1.5% for broader security-related spending. Canadian defence planning documents say the country is now on that pathway. NATO estimates European members and Canada collectively increased core defence spending by nearly 20% in real terms in 2025. Ottawa therefore faces a fundamental industrial question: if tens of billions more are going to be spent, how much of that demand should create manufacturing capacity and technical expertise inside Canada rather than flow automatically to established U.S. suppliers?
Europe Is Becoming a Much Bigger Part of Canada’s Defence Network
Military procurement is only one part of Ottawa’s broader diversification. Canada signed an agreement in February to participate in the European Union’s Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, initiative. Canadian government documents say the agreement gives Canadian companies preferential access to procurement supported through the EU program, which provides up to €150 billion in loans for eligible defence acquisitions. Canada says it is the first non-European country to receive this form of preferential participation, opening opportunities in areas ranging from artillery and ammunition to drones, air defence and critical infrastructure.
The relationships are widening beyond procurement contracts. In July, Canada became the first observer country in the Global Combat Air Programme, the British-Italian-Japanese effort developing a next-generation combat aircraft targeted for the 2030s. On September 16, Carney announced that Canada had formally applied to join the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, a rapid-response military grouping of northern European NATO countries. The Canadian and British governments also discussed deeper industrial cooperation through GCAP. None of these arrangements replaces NATO or NORAD. Collectively, however, they give Ottawa more military, technological and industrial relationships to draw upon if political conditions in Washington become less predictable.
Trump’s NATO Pressure Has Produced a Complicated Result
Trump has spent years demanding that NATO allies carry a larger share of the defence burden, and on one major measure that pressure has coincided with a dramatic change. NATO says European allies and Canada increased core defence investment by more than US$139 billion after making their latest spending commitment. At the Ankara summit in July, alliance officials pointed to more than €50 billion in announced procurement deals and reiterated the goal of shifting more responsibility for conventional defence toward European members and Canada. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also been a major driver of that spending surge, making it difficult to attribute the increase to any single political factor.
Reuters’ reporting highlights the paradox. The same pressure encouraging allies to spend more is also prompting some governments to question whether greater spending should mean greater dependence on American suppliers. Reuters found growing concern about U.S. reliability among officials on both sides of the Atlantic, even though the United States still maintains more than 81,000 military personnel in Europe and continues investing heavily in European bases. Washington therefore remains indispensable to NATO’s present military structure. What appears to be changing is the assumption that it will always occupy exactly the same role—or that every additional dollar of allied defence spending will necessarily translate into another order for an American defence contractor.
Canada Is Diversifying, Not Decoupling From the United States
The limits of Canada’s pivot are just as important as the headline-grabbing deals. Canada’s own Defence Department describes the bilateral relationship with the United States as central to North American security. NORAD operations remain fully integrated, hundreds of Canadian military personnel serve in the United States, and Canada is spending C$38.6 billion over 20 years on capabilities associated with NORAD modernization. The defence industrial relationship is equally difficult to unwind: government figures say more than 60% of Canadian defence-industry exports go to the United States.
That means Ottawa’s emerging strategy is better understood as reducing single-country dependency than abandoning the U.S. defence ecosystem. Canada can buy Australian radar, pursue Swedish surveillance aircraft, participate in European financing programs and investigate future British-Italian-Japanese fighter technology while still operating F-35s, buying HIMARS and defending North America jointly with the United States. The practical objective is resilience: having additional suppliers, production capacity and political partnerships when circumstances demand them. Reuters’ investigation suggests Canada is not alone in reaching that conclusion. Trump’s pressure has helped accelerate NATO spending, but it has also encouraged several allies to think more seriously about how much of their security should depend on one country’s weapons, technology and political decisions.
